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Campaign finance reform has become the Vietnam of First
Amendment theory and doctrine. Or perhaps, in deference to the
sensibilities of my generation, I should say that it has become the Kosovo,
since the beneficence of our intentions in the latter case is so much more
apparent. With the best of motives, we have created a quagmire.
My own untutored inclination would be to approach the issue of
campaign finance reform by focusing on floors rather than ceilings.'
Instead of restricting expenditures, it would seem to me easier and more
efficacious to require each broadcast licensee, as a condition for its license,
to reserve a fixed amount of time for the speech of bona fide candidates
during an election. Such an approach would endow candidates with the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in public deliberation. It would be
simple and efficient. It would diminish the elaborate, intrusive, and
expensive regulatory regime that we presently endure. I very much doubt
that after Red Lion2 there could be any serious First Amendment objection
to such a scheme,3 and, although the scheme might be challenged as a
taking of the property of broadcasters, my guess is that such a challenge
would not prove insuperable.
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1. See, e.g., Joel Fleischman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Toward a
New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211, 215 (1984) (urging the imposition of
a level-up approach that would increase the amount and diversity of political speech over a level-down
theory that would merely impose spending restrictions).
2. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 663, 670 n.30 (1997).
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For whatever reason,4 however, neither Congress nor the academy
has elected to explore this approach, choosing instead to pursue egalitarian
goals by imposing ceilings on contributions and expenditures during
elections. But because these regulatory efforts have been torn apart by
constitutional distinctions between contributions and expenditures,'
between corporations and persons,6 between vagueness and clarity,7
between issue advocacy and candidate advocacy,' they have turned night-
marish in their complexity and futility.
Both Richard Briffault's Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections!
Politics Line and Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes's Electoral
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment attempt to cut through the
Gordian knot of these entanglements. They seek to do so by distinguishing
the First Amendment doctrine applicable to political speech from the First
Amendment doctrine applicable to elections. Somewhat along the lines of
Edwin Baker's pioneering work,9 Briffault argues that because elections
have a distinct sociological structure and purpose, speech in elections ought
to be protected by a constitutional regime that flows from values appro-
priate to elections, rather than by a regime that embodies the values of
political speech generally. Schauer and Pildes argue that such a domain-
specific application of First Amendment doctrine would be no embarrass-
ment to First Amendment theory, "because exceptionalism in the First
Amendment is the rule and not the exception.""0
In the past, I have argued that First Amendment jurisprudence in fact
protects constitutional values inherent in particular social structures, rather
than communication per se," and so I find the general approach of
4. For some of the reasons offered against a government-enforced extension of broadcast time for
candidates, see Lillian A. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1258, 1266 (1994) (arguing that expanding the role of government in
allocating political resources will lead inevitably to greater factionalism as groups seek to manipulate
strategically lawmakers and the lawmaking process); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225, 226-27
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (averring that from government ensuring resources for viewpoints
to be heard, "it is but a short step to suppression pure and simple"); and Bradley A. Smith, Money
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 98 (1997) (asserting
that the First Amendment's language makes clear that public discussion was to be fostered by protecting
individual liberties, "not through an activist government role in political debate").
5. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1976).
6. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
8. See Richard Briffault, IssueAdvocacy:Redrawing the Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 TEXAS L. REV.
1751 (1999).
9. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 3 (1998) (taking the position that campaign speech should be viewed as part of the institutionalized
electoral system rather than belonging to the wider realm of political speech).
10. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,
77 TEXAS L. REV. 1803, 1835 (1999).




Briffault, Schauer, and Pildes highly congenial. What is necessary to make
the approach convincing, however, is a detailed appraisal of what constitu-
tionally would be gained, and what lost, by demarcating elections as a
separate domain of First Amendment doctrine.
Schauer and Pildes in principle repudiate the necessity for any such
appraisal. They believe that the illusion of this necessity flows from the
mistaken view that "election-specific First Amendment principles ... are
inconsistent with essential features of the First Amendment itself." 2
From the bare fact that the First Amendment "is not a monolith," Schauer
and Pildes seek to draw the conclusion that "developing distinct principles
for electoral speech" is constitutionally unproblematic. 3 But implicit in
such an argument is the view, intimated by Schauer elsewhere,' 4 that
there are no First Amendment principles by which the question of
exceptions can itself by evaluated.
Such an extremely nominalist view of the First Amendment is highly
implausible. If First Amendment jurisprudence is truly nothing more than
a collection of exceptions, then it is merely an empty label, useful only as
a bald and conclusory justification for judicial meddling with legislative
determinations. A First Amendment that offers no principles by which the
boundaries and nature of "exceptions" are to be determined would be
intellectually superfluous and without independent significance.
This way of putting the matter, however, is misleading. Schauer and
Pildes are certainly correct to notice that there are vast fields of
communication whose regulation is untouched by First Amendment
doctrine, so that it makes little sense to conceive of the First Amendment
as staking out general principles for the protection of all expression. 5
And they are also correct to notice that once we abandon the aspiration to
12. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1836.
13. Id. at 1835.
14. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV.
84, 107 n. 106 (1998). It is not so clear, however, that Richard Pildes, in his other writings, holds this
view. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Against Balancing: The Rule of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 727-29 (1994); Richard Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: SocialMeanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, XXVII J. LEGAL STUD. 725,729-
44 (1998). Perhaps this accounts for a certain internal tension within Electoral Exceptionalism and the
First Amendment. The primary thesis of the article seems to be that the very existence of domain-
specific First Amendment principles refutes "the argument that election-specific First Amendment
principles that are the necessary condition for campaign finance reform are inconsistent with essential
features of the First Amendment." Schauer & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1836. Yet in occasional
passages the article seems to make the quite different point that, although "there is no one general value
or interest that free speech protects," id. at 1819, "[gleneral principles and values associated with the
First Amendment of course remain relevant" in ascertaining the constitutional meaning of "ongoing
social practices," id. at 1819, 1816, like elections. This latter point seems to me correct, but if it is
true then some analysis of these principles and values would appear to be necessary in order to
determine whether election speech ought to be deemed a distinct domain of First Amendment doctrine.
Yet no such analysis appears in Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment.
15. See Post, supra note 11, at 1255.
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such general principles, the complementary image of "exceptions" must
also be jettisoned. But it does not follow from either (or both) of these
premises that the First Amendment is therefore reduced to a nominalist
collection of doctrines applicable only to particular contexts, and that the
First Amendment must lack relevance for the issue of how we pick and
choose our doctrines and our contexts.
It is more plausible to view the First Amendment as bearing distinctive
constitutional values that seek to realize themselves in discrete social
domains. Most pertinent for the subject of this Symposium, the First
Amendment defines and safeguards the communicative dimensions of the
social practice of democratic self-governance. 16 The First Amendment
ensures that legal regulation of "public discourse" is not inconsistent with
the constitutional value of collective self-determination. 7 The restrictions
imposed by the First Amendment on the regulation of public discourse are
qualitatively different from those imposed by the First Amendment on the
regulation of speech in other social fields, as for example on the regulation
of speech within managerial domains, where speech is routinely subordi-
nated to the attainment of instrumental ends. 18
The question of whether election speech should be characterized as
within such a managerial domain, or instead as within public discourse, 9
is a question that affects the meaning and scope of public discourse. For
that reason it is a question that impacts First Amendment values, and it is
inaccurate to assert, as do Schauer and Pildes, that because the First
Amendment has domain-specific applications, there is nothing more consti-
tutionally to be said about the question of whether election speech ought to
be hived off from public discourse. The reach and significance of public
discourse is preeminently a First Amendment question.
16. See, e.g., Robert Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social
Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds.,
1993).
17. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1122 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake]. As part
of their effort to establish the "rle" of exceptions within First Amendment doctrine, Schauer and
Pildes seek to demonstrate that constitutional protections for "political speech" are "institution
dependent." But what their argument actually establishes is that speech with political content can be
regulated according to the domain in which it occurs. The argument does not impair the relevance of
"public discourse" as a pertinent and puissant category of First Amendment analysis, because the
boundaries of public discourse are not defined by reference (merely) to the content of speech; they are
set instead by constitutional apprehension of the meaning and reach of the practice of self-
determination. For a fuller discussion of the boundaries of public discourse, see Robert Post, The
Constitutional Concept ofPublicDiscourse: Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 667-84 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Robert Post, Between Management and Governance: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1775 (1987).
19. For a discussion of how the classification of election speech as within a managerial domain




At present there are two distinct First Amendment accounts of the
value of democratic self-government. The first derives from the work of
Alexander Meiklejohn, and it stresses the importance of establishing the
communicative preconditions for fair and informed collective decision-
making. The second is what I shall call a participatory model, and it
emphasizes instead the role of public discourse in establishing democratic
legitimacy.' The participatory model focuses on speakers as participants
in the autonomous construction of democratic identity; the Meiklejohnian
model focuses on the capacity of citizens to receive and utilize information
in deciding future action.
In the context of elections, the participatory model would require that
public discourse remain sufficiently open to citizens and candidates as to
serve for them the function of securing democratic legitimacy by enabling
the reconciliation of individual and collective self-determination." The
Meiklejohnian model would require that communication within the context
of elections be sufficiently rich and textured as to ensure electoral decisions
that are fully informed of available alternatives and options.
It is striking that the egalitarianism which runs so fiercely through
contemporary efforts at campaign finance reform7 is alien to both these
models. A central tenet of the Meiklejohnian tradition is that the First
Amendment "does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall
take part in public debate .... What is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."' Within the
Meiklejohnian model there is potential tension between egalitarian values
and the overriding objective of producing an informed and educated
electorate.24
The tension between egalitarian values and the participatory model is
perhaps even sharper, for such values may conflict with the primary goal
20. On the contrast between these models, see id. at 1117, 1123 (comparing Meiklejohn's
communicative precondition model with the participatory model). See generally Robert Post, Equality
and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1517 (1997) [hereinafter Post,
Equality and Autonomy].
21. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 20, at 1538 n.41. It is ultimately this point that
drives my preferred focus on floors rather than ceilings. See supra text accompanying note 1.
22. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (proposing that the Constitution should contain a
principle "that would guarantee to each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of
supporting or opposing any candidate or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the United
States"); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1369, 1382 (1994) (asserting that after exorcising superfluous reasons for reform the "objective that
remains, as a potentially clear-cut goal of campaign finance reform, is equality"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1399 (1994) (noting that
redressing either economic or political inequalities is a proper role for government to play in our
political system).
23. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948).
24. See, e.g., Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 20, at 1528-29, 1537.
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of establishing democratic legitimacy.' The Supreme Court quite suc-
cinctly articulated the perspective of the participatory model when it
famously held in Buckley that "the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed . . . 'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.' "
Kathleen Sullivan has shrewdly observed that the source of the
egalitarian values so evident in the contemporary debate about campaign
finance reform lies in the principle of "one person, one vote."27 What is
striking about this principle, however, is that it does not concern speech,
but rather the aggregation of preferences for purposes of collective
decision-making. It is not obvious how egalitarian principles of preference
aggregation ought to relate to the design of a structure of communication.
Yet the very predominance of egalitarian thinking in the campaign finance
reform literature suggests the extent to which political speech, which was
meant both to inform voting and to endow it with democratic legitimacy,'
has become identified with and subordinated to the process of voting itself.
This order of priority is evident in Briffault's discussion, which builds
on the twin premises that "[e]lections are our central form of collective
political decision-making" and that "[c]ampaign communications are a
crucial part of elections."29 Briffault's article is entirely admirable and
nuanced in its evaluation of relevant constitutional considerations. Yet it
is fundamentally constructed upon a constitutional vision that imagines
election speech as integral to "the role of the election as a mechanism for
collective choice,"3" and the articulation and defense of this vision passes
by very quickly.
It is important to be clear that there is no simple "fact of the matter"
here. It is surely the case that election speech affects elections, but so does
all public discourse. If all that were necessary to bring speech within the
authority of a managerial domain were that the speech produce effects on
the domain, nothing much would be left of public discourse.3 How we
25. See, e.g., id. at 1537-38.
26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
27. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 671-75.
28. It is both practically and theoretically inaccurate to assume that democratic legitimacy can be
secured by the mere fact of voting. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 20, at 1524 (voting
is "merely a mechanism for decisionmaking, a mechanism that can easily turn oppressive").
29. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1763.
30. Id. at 1802.
31. The Court has certainly recognized this point. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
563 (1968), for example, the speech of a school teacher adversely affected the operation of a school
board, and yet the Court explicitly refused to accept this as a sufficient criterion for subordinating the
school teacher's speech to the managerial authority of the school board. For a fuller discussion of the
boundaries of managerial domains, see Post, supra note 18, at 1784-1809.
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decide which speech gets incorporated into the "mechanism" of elections,
and which speech remains within public discourse, must therefore depend
upon a full assessment of the impact of the distinction on public discourse
and on elections.
This suggests that the placement of a line between election speech and
public discourse must be sensitive to the nature of the proposed regulation
of election speech. Relatively more benign forms of regulation, like
disclosure requirements, may constitutionally reach more deeply into the
recesses of public discourse than more draconian requirements, like expen-
diture limitations.
In his article, however, Briffault proposes a boundary between election
speech and political speech that, if I understand it correctly, is designed to
be clear, distinct, and indifferent to the kind of regulation of election
speech that is at issue. This approach may be justified by reasons of
policy, but I am confident that any constitutional assignment of the
boundary between election speech and public discourse will ultimately
prove far more context-dependent. The line proposed by Briffault may
therefore in particular circumstances prove over- or underinclusive when
measured against constitutional norms.
That having been said, it is difficult to quarrel with Briffault's basic
point that if we are to regulate election speech, we ought to do so in ways
that are effective rather than futile. Briffault's proposed line sounds
plausible to me, but I have neither the experience nor the expertise to
evaluate whether it will achieve its commendable policy goals. What I
need no expertise to observe, however, is that Briffault's line has the
potential for seriously and adversely affecting public discourse, depending
upon the severity of the statutory regulations of election speech it is meant
to implement.
Of course, this fact would not by itself necessarily render the line
unconstitutional. My observation is meant instead merely to motivate the
preference I noted at the outset of this Comment for election reforms that
seek to establish floors rather than ceilings. It strikes me as plain good
sense to attempt to avoid harm to public discourse if we can. We have a
chance to avoid such harm if we can attain our ends by providing campaign
subsidies rather than by imposing spending restrictions. If subsidies prove
insufficient, there will be time enough to proceed to more stringent and
problematic measures.
1999] 1843
"k'k
